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The Press and the Expectation of Executive
Counterspeech
RonNell Andersen Jones *

I. INTRODUCTION
Few catch phrases have burst onto the American political and journalistic
scene with as much vigor as the term “fake news.” President Donald Trump
first used the expression in a tweet as president-elect, 1 and it rapidly became
his go-to response to a wide variety of news reports, ranging from allegations
of his campaign’s ties to Russia, 2 to assertions of sexual assault 3 or discussions
of the significant turnover in White House staffing. 4 President Trump and his
advisors have never specifically defined what they mean when they label a
story from the press “fake news,” 5 but it has now been invoked as a retort on
*
Lee E. Teitelbaum Endowed Chair & Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law,
University of Utah Law School and Affiliated Fellow, Yale Law School Information
Society Project. The author thanks Tyler Hubbard and Angela Shewan for their research assistance and the participants of both the 2017 Free Speech Discussion Forum
and the Price Sloan Symposium for Media, Ethics and Law presented by the University
of Missouri School of Law and the Missouri School of Journalism at the National Press
Club for their insights and feedback.
1. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 10, 2016, 9:11 AM
EST), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/807588632877998081 (“Reports by
@CNN that I will be working on The Apprentice during my Presidency, even part time,
are ridiculous & untrue - FAKE NEWS!”).
2. Donald Trump’s News Conference: Full Transcript and Video, N.Y TIMES
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politics/trump-press-conference-transcript.html [hereinafter Trump’s News Conference] (responding to questions
about the Russian dossier and meddling in the election, then stating that the reports and
articles are “fake news”).
3. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 20, 2018, 10:16 AM
EST), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/965968309358333952 (responding
to allegations from the “Fake News Washington Post”).
4. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 7, 2017, 9:14 AM
EST), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/839116941956640768 (“Don’t let the
FAKE NEWS tell you that there is big infighting in the Trump Admin.”).
5. See Chris Cillizza, Donald Trump Just Claimed He Invented ‘Fake News’,
CNN (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/08/politics/trump-huckabeefake/index.html (discussing Trump’s interview where he claimed he invented the term,
but did not define it); see also Lucia Graves, How Trump Weaponized ‘Fake News’ for
His Own Political Gain, PAC. STANDARD (Feb. 26, 2018), https://psmag.com/socialjustice/how-trump-weaponized-fake-news-for-his-own-political-ends (stating that dictionaries and scholars struggle to define it); Katy Steinmetz, The Dictionary Is Adding
an Entry for ‘Fake News’, TIME (Sept. 27, 2017), http://time.com/4959488/donaldtrump-fake-news-meaning/ (discussing disagreement over the definition of “fake
news” amongst dictionaries).
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hundreds of occasions—in interviews, at public appearances, and on social media. 6
The “fake news” retort is just one of a number of recent presidential responses to press coverage that have proven unsatisfying to critics because they
are nonresponsive—that is, they lack clear, substantive content or verifiable
facts that specifically counter the news story or otherwise clarify the truth. 7
Other nonresponsive retorts, including bare labeling of coverage as “bad” 8 or

6. Angie Drobnic Holan, The Media’s Definition of Fake News vs. Donald
Trump’s, POLITIFACT (Oct. 18, 2017, 2:11 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2017/oct/18/deciding-whats-fake-medias-definition-fake-news-vs/ (stating
that between January 2017 and November 2017, Trump had used the term “fake news”
at least 153 times); Brian Stelter, Trump Averages a ‘Fake’ Insult Every Day. Really.
(Jan.
17,
2018,
5:05
PM
EST),
We
Counted.,
CNN
http://money.cnn.com/2018/01/17/media/president-trump-fake-news-count/index.html (stating that between January 17, 2017, and January 20, 2018, Trump used the
word “fake” 404 times in tweets or during public appearances). Trump has used the
term in various formats. See, e.g., President Trump Ranted for 77 Minutes in Phoenix.
Here’s What He Said, TIME (Aug. 23, 2017), http://time.com/4912055/donald-trumpphoenix-arizona-transcript/ (using the term “fake news” twice and “fake media” once
during the rally); Ian Schwartz, Full Lou Dobbs Interview: Trump Asks What Could be
More Fake Than CBS, NBC, ABC and CNN?, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2017/10/25/full_lou_dobbs_interview_trump_asks_what_could_be_more_fake_than_cbs_nbc_abc_and_cnn.html (referencing fake news seven times in the interview with Lou Dobbs that aired on October
25, 2017); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 11, 2017, 9:55 AM
EST), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/918112884630093825 (“With all of
the Fake News coming out of NBC and the Networks, at what point is it appropriate to
challenge their License [sic]? Bad for our country!”); Trump’s News Conference, supra
note 2 (calling Jim Acosta of CNN “fake news”); see also Sarah Sanders (@PressSec),
TWITTER (Jan. 13, 2018, 6:37 PM EST), https://twitter.com/PressSec/status/952323750401331202 (posting an image with the title “Fake News: The Wall Street
Journal. Fake News Is at It Again!”).
7. Paul Waldman, Opinion, Donald Trump Is Executing a Brilliant Media Strategy. If Only He Had a Strategy for Governing., WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2016/12/23/donald-trump-isexecuting-a-brilliant-media-strategy-if-only-he-had-a-strategy-for-governing/?utm_term=.da6ae143a52d (discussing the lack of news conferences and that “the
media are starved for news” from this administration); see also Jason Schwartz,
Trump’s Press Strategy: A Few Questions, Then a Quick Escape, POLITICO (Dec. 29,
2017, 5:04 AM EST), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/29/trump-press-mediastrategy-319617 (describing Trump’s strategy to “[k]eep[] exchanges with the media
short and avoid situations where he could be pinned down with in-depth questions and
follow-ups.”).
8. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 14, 2017,
6:29 PM EST), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/897223558073602049
(“Made additional remarks on Charlottesville and realized once again that the #Fake
News Media will never be satisfied . . . truly bad people!”).
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“wrong,” 9 generic comments about what “people say,” 10 vague threats that
President Trump possesses contrary but unspecified evidence, 11 or ad hominem
attacks on individual journalists, 12 share the same frustrating traits as the “fake
news” rejoinder. These responses assert what is not but contribute little concrete, additional information about what is.
Commentators have noted—and complained about—the apparent trend, 13
but most of their criticisms have been focused on the ways that the “fake news”

9. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 6, 2018,
7:55 AM EST), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/971006379375972354
(“The new Fake News narrative is that there is CHAOS in the White House. Wrong!
People will always come & go, and I want strong dialogue before making a final decision. I still have some people that I want to change (always seeking perfection). There
is no Chaos, only great Energy!”).
10. See, e.g., Rebecca Savransky, Trump on Chinese President: ‘Some People
Might Call Him the King of China’, HILL (Oct. 26, 2017, 9:55 AM EST),
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/357284-trump-on-chinese-presidentsome-people-might-call-him-the-king-of (quoting a Trump interview with Lou Dobbs
where the President said: “People say we have the best relationship of any presidentpresident, because he’s called president also”); Remarks by President Trump in Cabinet
Meeting, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-cabinet-meeting-6/ (discussing the amount of people
impacted by DACA, Trump stated: “A lot of people say 800,000; some people said —
yesterday, first time I heard 650 [thousand]. I also heard 3 million. The fact is, our
country was such a mess, nobody even knows what the numbers are. But we’ll know
what the numbers are.”).
11. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 4, 2017,
6:52 AM EST), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/837994257566863360 (“I’d
bet a good lawyer could make a great case out of the fact that President Obama was
tapping my phones in October, just prior to Election!”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 12, 2017, 8:26 AM EST), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/863007411132649473 (“James Comey better hope that there are no
‘tapes’ of our conversations before he starts leaking to the press!”).
12. RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and the
Press, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1301, 1318–20 (2017) (discussing the various targeted attacks
on individual reporters, most notably his “vulgar attacks on the physical appearance,
intelligence, and mental health of two news anchors . . . .”).
13. See, e.g., Marisa Kellam & Elizabeth A. Stein, Trump’s War on the News Media Is Serious. Just Look at Latin America, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://wapo.st/2lijqCW?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.2a7c8ba8e0c7; Trump’s War on
Journalism, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-ed-trumpswar-on-journalism/ (“By branding reporters as liars, [Trump] apparently hopes to discredit, disrupt or bully into silence anyone who challenges his version of reality.”).
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mantra evidences an unquestioning political base 14 or demonstrates an unfortunate disrespect for the role of the press. 15 In fact, however, much more is at
stake when the president routinely offers nonresponsive retorts to press reporting. The greater, but mostly unrecognized, harm is that these retorts are being
offered as a substitute for counter-assertions by—and engagement with—the
executive. If a news report that is distributed to the public is erroneous, then
democracy and First Amendment values are served by the president contributing more information with additional accuracy—not by the president shutting
down dialogue with nonresponsive retorts or labeling the news coverage “fake”
without revealing what the truth is. On many topics, the President of the United
States is better positioned than anyone in the world to counter misinformation
and to clarify and correct errors. A president’s unwillingness or inability to do
so violates longstanding constitutional norms and upsets jurisprudential expectations about the role of the press, the role of government, and the flow of information in a democracy.
This Article explores the wider constitutional and democratic consequences of a president’s refusal to engage in counterspeech on matters of public
concern. It argues that both fundamental principles of First Amendment theory
and watershed cases from the United States Supreme Court presuppose a constitutional system of dialogue between the press and the executive in which the
president offers verifiable, supported, fact-based counterspeech to press coverage with which he disagrees. Part II of this Article describes how marketplaceof-ideas, self-governance, and checking-function principles—although more
often invoked to protect private speech from governmental restriction—also
manifest a longstanding assumption of executive counterspeech. It explores
the clear expectation within First Amendment jurisprudence that presidents
will dialogue with, rather than shut down, the press when the press’s reporting
on matters of public concern is erroneous, misleading, or otherwise faulty. Part
III of this Article describes the essential characteristics of this democracy-enhancing counterspeech and the ways in which nonresponsive retorts fall short
of meeting the constitutional aims envisioned by the Court. Part IV details the
harms that follow from these failings. I argue that, in addition to having the
significant consequences of hampering government accountability and the
public’s quest for truth, flouting the norm of executive counterspeech diminishes the wider tone of dialogue nationally and threatens the viability of the
14. See, e.g., Peter Apps, Commentary: Trump’s Early War with the Media Will
Damage Both, REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trump-media-commentary/commentary-trumps-early-war-with-the-media-will-damage-bothidUSKBN1582HI (“If you can’t trust anyone[, including the media,] . . . then it becomes more difficult to question those in authority.”).
15. See, e.g., Paul Farhi, Press Advocates See Trump’s Words Behind Physical
Attacks on Journalists, WASH. POST (May 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/press-advocates-see-trumps-words-behind-physical-attacks-on-journalists/2017/05/25/f8ced468-4162-11e7-9869bac8b446820a_story.html?utm_term=.a3cca11d1999 (discussing the rise in disrespect
of journalists and subsequent violent interactions).
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larger marketplace of ideas. The abandonment of this norm creates a grave
threat to the democracy-enhancing role of accurate press coverage. But it also
disserves democratic and free-speech values when the press coverage is inaccurate. Indeed, despite the President’s apparent goal of disparaging the press,
his failure to engage in executive counterspeech may leave the press itself insufficiently checked by the executive.

II. THE EXPECTATIONS OF EXECUTIVE COUNTERSPEECH IN A SYSTEM
OF FREE SPEECH AND PRESS
The theoretical and jurisprudential underpinnings of the American system
of free speech and press understandably focus on the private speaker. Because
the First Amendment erects a barrier to governmental regulation of speech, 16
the justifications for our system of free speech center on private expression.
Thus, when we consider the ways that free speech enhances our search for
truth, our efforts for self-government, and our goal of governmental accountability, we ordinarily do so through the lens of the private speaker. But this
analytical scaffolding is not sustainable by mere individual freedom to speak.
Scholarship exploring these themes, and United States Supreme Court jurisprudence animated by these themes, evinces a wider expectation—indeed, a
democratic imperative—that the executive will be a participant in meaningful
conversations on matters of public concern and will respond with substantive
counterspeech to erroneous assertions by the press on those issues.

A. The Expectation of Executive Counterspeech in Major Free Speech
Theories
A set of oft-cited theories provide the foundation for a system of free
speech and press in our democracy. 17 Three of the primary theories justifying
such a system—the marketplace-of-ideas theory, the Meiklejohnian self-governance theory, and the checking-function 18 theory—all share a largely unrecognized central premise. All three analytical approaches implicitly assume that
government officials in a democracy will engage in dialogue with the public
and the press. 19 The values of finding knowledge and truth in a marketplace
of ideas, of facilitating representative democracy, and of checking abuses of

16. Sorell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011) (“The First Amendment
requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates ‘a regulation of speech
. . . .” (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
17. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47–51
(1989); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 529–44 (1977), http://www.jstor.org/stable/827945 (tracing the
foundation for free speech theory).
18. Blasi, supra note 17, at 554–65, 565 n.146.
19. See id.
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governmental power are all advanced by meaningful executive counterspeech.
All are crippled by its absence.

1. The Marketplace of Ideas and Executive Counterspeech
At the very heart of modern First Amendment jurisprudence is a freespeech theory with a longstanding pedigree. The belief that “the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . .
.” 20—is both “the theory of our Constitution” 21 and the structure on which all
our important national conversations are built. The model is, at base, an adversarial one: if truth and falsehood battle, truth will emerge the victor. 22 In
the process, the public benefits. When the tested material proves false, correct
information replaces incorrect information. When the tested material proves
true, believers gain a “clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.” 23
The marketplace theory tells us not only why free discussion matters—
“for advancing knowledge and discovering truth” 24—but also how participants
in free discussion ideally behave. “An individual who seeks knowledge and
truth must hear all sides of the question, consider all alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it to opposition, and make full use of different minds.” 25 The
theory thus envisions an active exchange, a vibrant give-and-take, and “participation in decision making by all members of society” 26 as they take “precautions against their own fallibility” 27 and offer additional information to others
who are doing the same. The envisioned contributions to the marketplace are
not merely subjective ideas or opinions that the speaker hopes she may be able
to persuade others to adopt, but also objective, factual information that the

20. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
21. Id.
22. See John Milton, Areopagitica, in AREOPAGITICA AND OF EDUCATION 50

(George H. Sabine ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1951) (1644) (“Let [Truth] and Falsehood
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?”).
23. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 53 (Stefan Collini, ed., Cambridge University Press 1989) (1859); see also, THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE
EXPRESSION 7 (1970) (“Discussion must be kept open no matter how certainly true and
accepted opinion may seem to be; many of the most widely acknowledged truths have
turned out to be erroneous. Conversely, the same principle applies no matter how false
or pernicious the new opinion appears to be; for the unaccepted opinion may be true or
partially true and, even if wholly false, its presentation and open discussion compel a
rethinking and retesting of the accepted opinion.”).
24. See EMERSON, supra note 23, at 7–8.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See MILL, supra note 23, at 22.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss4/7

6

Jones: The Press and the Expectation of Executive Counterspeech

2018]

EXECUTIVE COUNTERSPEECH

945

speaker possesses that would inform others. 28 The theory thus anticipates that
speakers who are invested in an outcome and know facts that would inform the
discussion will provide them to the marketplace. Such a system “is an essential
mechanism for maintaining the balance between stability and change” because
it “provides a framework in which the conflict necessary to the progress of
society can take place without destroying the society.” 29
The United States Supreme Court has embraced this marketplace notion,
expressing a jurisprudential confidence that “the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and
that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.” 30 When speech in the
public square is asserted to be offensive, 31 dangerous, 32 or false, 33 the Court
consistently responds that “the remedy to be applied is more speech . . . .” 34
The Court frequently reminds us that the Founders valued liberty not merely
as an end, but as a means to the discovery and spread of truth. We protect
ourselves as a nation, the Court says, through discussion—with meaningful

28. See Blasi supra note 17, at 553 (“[S]omehow we have come to think of the
passionate, often uninformed, soapbox orator as the class embodiment of our commitment to diversity. . . . Yet a marketplace can trade in information as well as ideas, and
in fact most of us probably seek new information more assiduously than we seek new
points of view.”).
29. MILL, supra note 23, at 22.
30. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring),
overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969).
31. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 414 (1989)) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment,
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (calling the speech at issue in the case “offensive,” “but
the sort of expression involved in this case does not seem to us to be governed by any
exception to the general First Amendment principles . . . .”).
32. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (suggesting we protect speech unless it “would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil
which the state constitutionally may seek to prevent”); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449
(striking down an Ohio statute because it did not distinguish “from incitement to imminent lawless action”).
33. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344–46 (1974) (describing the high
constitutional bar for libel against public officials and public figures, who have “significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a
more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy”).
34. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377.
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contributions to the marketplace of ideas designed to counter, refute, and clarify other contributions. 35 Making those contributions, then, is “a political duty”
and “a fundamental principle of the American government.” 36
Although the marketplace-of-ideas analogy is most often invoked against
government regulation of the marketplace in ways that would hamper discourse
among private speakers, 37 the theory is plainly premised on the assumption that
the executive also can, should, and will contribute to the marketplace of ideas.
A quest for truth in the discussion of public matters is debilitated when information held primarily or exclusively by the president is withheld from the marketplace. The principle that false speech is remedied by more speech—and the
concomitant principle that discussion offers clarification and improved understanding of even true speech—are no less true when the holder of the true information is a key government official. Indeed, while the marketplace theory
has faced thoughtful criticism from those questioning both the likelihood of
fair access to the market 38 and the likelihood that truth will emerge from it, 39
the theory’s core principles unquestionably support accurate executive counterspeech as a critical aspect of the search for truth on matters of public concern. Withholding clarification or correction in the face of erroneous or misleading news coverage violates the ideal and robs the market of its essential
ingredients.

35. Id. at 375 (“Those who won our independence believed that the final end of
the state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end
and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be
the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that
without free speech and assembly[,] discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine . . . .”).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (quoting
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–04 (1984)) (“[T]he
freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty . . . but also is
essential to the common quest for truth . . . . We have therefore been particularly vigilant to ensure that individual expressions of ideas remain free from governmentally
imposed sanctions.”).
38. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press – A New First Amendment Right,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1641, 1648 (1967) (arguing that “a self-operating marketplace
of ideas . . . has long ceased to exist” and that “a right of expression is somewhat thin
if it can be exercised only at the sufferance of the managers of mass communications”).
39. See Harry H. Wellington, Our Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105,
1130 (1979) (“In the long run, true ideas do tend to drive out false ones. The problem
is that the short run may be very long . . . .”); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 974, 978 (1978) (calling “the
hope that the marketplace leads to truth” an “implausible” notion given the ways the
market is “biased in favor of presently dominant groups . . . .”).
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The marketplace theory does not call for a marketplace of ideas comprised of purely private competitors, with no contribution of facts or opinions
from elected officials. Such a market would lack important information unavailable from any other source. Instead, the theory envisions that speakers—
including the executive—will contribute ideas and demonstrate that those ideas
can “survive and endure against hostile criticism.” 40 Moreover, counterspeech
by a government official “can be especially important to an equality-based conception of free speech when its voice counters that of powerful, private speakers.” 41 In cases focused on core political speech, the Court has “emphasized
the value of the government’s voice” in fulfilling this marketplace role. 42 Executive counterspeech can insert new data and new perspectives into narratives
previously controlled in one-sided ways by private speakers. 43 Indeed, as First
Amendment scholar Helen Norton has noted, private speech is often problematically nontransparent and unaccountable to the public. 44 Because even false
political speech by private speakers can be constitutionally protected, executive counterspeech may be a crucial competitor to misleading or inaccurate
speech in the marketplace of ideas. 45 “[G]overnment will not inevitably speak
in opposition to powerful, private interests; indeed it is often aligned with
them,” 46 but the marketplace theory suggests that the president’s contributions
play a valuable part in the discussions. “[T]he point is not that the government’s views are necessarily correct, but instead that they may provide value
by responding to speech from powerful, private parties that might otherwise
not face effective rebuttal.” 47
40. Harry Kalven, Jr., If This be Asymmetry, Make the Most of It!, CENTER MAG.,
May/June 1973, at 36 (“It is an insufficiently noticed aspect of the First Amendment
that it contemplates the vigorous use of self-help by the opponents of given doctrines,
ideas, and political positions. It is not the theory that all ideas and positions are entitled
to flourish under freedom of discussion. It is rather then that they must survive and
endure against hostile criticism.”). Kalven’s article was written in response to an article
by Antonin Scalia, arguing for the restoration of “adversary balance between the government and the press.” Id.
41. Helen Norton, Campaign Speech Law with a Twist: When the Government is
the Speaker, Not the Regulator, 61 EMORY L.J. 209, 249 (2011).
42. Id. at 224–25 (discussing as an example an opinion that “emphasized the value
of the government’s voice in informing the voters on contested ballot measures – especially in countering powerful private speech . . . .”).
43. See, e.g., Helen Norton, The Government’s Manufacture of Doubt, 16 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 342, 342 (footnote omitted) (“This strategy was perhaps most famously employed by the tobacco industry in its longstanding campaign to contest the
mounting medical evidence that linked cigarettes to serious health conditions. At its
best, the government’s speech can counter such efforts and protect the public interest,
as exemplified by the Surgeon General’s groundbreaking 1964 report on the dangers of
tobacco, a report that challenged the industry’s preferred narrative.”).
44. Norton, supra note 41, at 252.
45. Id. at 252–53.
46. Id. at 253.
47. Id. at 250.
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Scholars have rarely explored the ramifications of presidential refusal to
contribute to the marketplace of ideas. This is likely because the scholarship
in the area has long been focused on the opposite concern—a concern about
asymmetry of power and the ways that the government’s disproportionate resources unfairly give its contributions greater weight. 48 Recognizing those
concerns, however, does not preclude a recognition of the possibility that the
pendulum may swing in the other direction and the executive may refuse to
contribute meaningful counterspeech. The marketplace theory envisions that
our system of competing ideas and information, with a back-and-forth of
speech and counterspeech, is the best mechanism for advancing knowledge and
finding truth. The underlying norm that government leaders will contribute
counterspeech is central to the theory’s structure and has proven critical to its
practical operation in the real world of dialogue on matters of public concern.

2. Self-Government and Executive Counterspeech
The expectation that the executive will engage in counterspeech becomes
even more apparent when the issue is considered through the lens of a second
prominent theory animating our First Amendment landscape: the Meiklejohnian concept of free speech as a facilitator of democratic self-governance.
Alexander Meikeljohn postulated that “[t]he First Amendment does not
protect ‘a freedom to speak.’ It protects the freedom of those activities of
thought and communication by which we ‘govern.’ It is concerned, not with a
private right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibility.” 49
Meikeljohn’s concept of an ideal democratic structure for “[p]ublic discussions
of public issues, together with the spreading of information and opinion bearing on those issues,” 50 envisions public conversations between and among voters, but also envisions dialogue between voters and their current and would-be

48. See, e.g., id. at 253 (noting the argument that “the government’s inherent
power, prestige, and especially resources tilt the playing field such that dissenting
speakers cannot fairly compete”); Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373, 385 (1983) (reviewing MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA
(1983)) (recognizing the potential for abuse in government speech but unwilling to
agree that all abuse is a First Amendment problem); Steven Shiffrin, Government
Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 592 (1980) (discussing government expenditures used
to finance a campaign to pass a tax referendum); Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Government
Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C. L. REV. 578,
580 (1980) (“The government’s use of public resources to manufacture citizen support
for a partisan viewpoint on political issues raises serious questions concerning the integrity of the democratic process.”).
49. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245, 255 (1961).
50. Id. at 257.
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representatives in government. The United States Supreme Court has recognized this driving force behind free speech protection, emphasizing that
“speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence
of self-government” 51 and that “speech on ‘matters of public concern’ . . . is
‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’” 52 Although arguments that
speech freedoms ought to be strictly limited to these narrowly defined “public”
issues or governmental matters 53 have been rejected as overly restrictive, 54 the
Court has repeatedly recognized that dialogue about—and with—government
officials “occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values[]’ and is entitled to special protection.”55 The theoretical justifications for
a system of free speech in a democracy are at their strongest when the conversations we are having are focused on public officials and their political deliberations. 56 Propelling this high-value status is an appreciation for both the historical origins of our First Amendment structure 57 and the democratic imperative for dialogue between the rulers and the ruled. The Founders believed “that
in [our] government[,] the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary[;] . . . that without free speech and assembly, discussion would be futile;
. . . that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.” 58 The entirety of American
free speech doctrine is animated by an understanding that the people will speak
to their government and that their government will speak back. 59 The right to

51. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964).
52. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59

(1985) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
53. See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 27 (1971) (“[T]he protection of the [F]irst [A]mendment . . . must be cut
off when it reaches the outer limits of political speech.”).
54. Id. at 34–35 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377–78 (1927)
(Brandeis, J. concurring), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44
(1969)).
55. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (citing NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1983)).
56. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 263 (1992)
(“[T]he First Amendment is fundamentally aimed at protecting democratic self-government . . . .”).
57. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs.”).
58. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
59. See William V. Luneburg, Civic Republicanism, the First Amendment, and
Executive Branch Policymaking, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 367, 370–71 (1991) (“[T]he President is one of the most important participants in the deliberative process mandated by
the Constitution . . . [and] the constitutional process of deliberation must be more than
a monologue; it must be a dialogue involving many interested ‘parties,’ including the
public at large.”).
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discuss policy ideas with other people would be an empty promise if not coupled with the expectation of ongoing discussion about those ideas with the people in power. 60 Without some provision of information from the president to
the people, the “important aspects of the freedom of speech and ‘of the press
could be eviscerated.’” 61 In analogous cases focused on the judiciary, the
Court has found that citizens must have access to and active engagement with
the work of that branch of government in order to “give meaning to those explicit [First Amendment] guarantees.” 62 The citizens’ need to receive counterspeech from the president is equally important to the First Amendment’s fuller
promise of engaged, democratic dialogue.
It is through the Meiklejohnian lens that we come to appreciate that free
speech about the government must “carr[y] with it some freedom to listen” 63
to information from the government. Hearing the president’s corrections or
clarifications is essential to the public’s First Amendment dialogue. Executive
counterspeech presents the opportunity for the voter to hear the ways in which
the president agrees or disagrees with her position and the factual premises on
which the president intends to base his decisions, which advances Meiklejohnian goals of enhanced self-governance. Self-governance goals dictate
that “the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the selfexpression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of
information from which members of the public may draw.” 64 The norm of
presidential counterspeech emerged from this understanding.
Unless we are told what the president knows, why he has formed the
views he has, and the factual information that he perceives as true, we cannot
understand and accept the work he claims to do in our name. 65 Indeed, Meiklejohn analogized all public discourse to a town meeting at which all viewpoints must be presented, debated, and considered in order for participants to
arrive at sound public policy. 66 It is unspoken, but obvious, that government
officials are present at the meeting—hosting it, substantively responding within
it, and informing and improving the public policymaking emerging from it.
Notably, an appreciation that free speech theory encompasses engagement with and response by public officials is highlighted in one of the Court’s
60. See id. at 370 (“[T]he President’s power as resulting in significant part from
his ability to persuade – in the sense of communicating with and perhaps thereby winning over what otherwise would be administrative resistance to his policy initiatives –
fits well with the notion of deliberative government as it was envisioned by the Framers.”).
61. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (citing
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
62. Id. at 575.
63. See id. at 576.
64. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
65. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 572 (“People in an open society
do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept
what they are prohibited from observing.”).
66. Meiklejohn, supra note 49, at 252, 260–61.
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most recent discussions of speech in the public forum. In Packingham v. North
Carolina, 67 the Court noted that a “fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen,
and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more.” 68 In suggesting that
social media is the quintessential modern public forum, 69 the Court explored
not only the ways citizens speak to each other and to their elected officials
using Facebook, Twitter, and other social media, but also the ways elected officials speak back. Noting that “[g]overnors in all [fifty states] and almost all
Members of Congress have set up accounts for this purpose,” the Court found
that social media is not merely a mechanism for citizens to petition their elected
representatives but that it is also a mechanism for citizens to “engage with
them.” 70
All told, the core self-governance rationale holds that we need a system
of free speech so that we can influence the executive’s decisions and “share in
devising methods by which those decisions can be made wise and effective.” 71
Executive counterspeech is an integral component of that system.

3. The Checking Function and Executive Counterspeech
Executive counterspeech responding to press coverage is important in a
democratic system of free speech not only because of what we know about the
role of government, but also because of what we know about the role of the
press. The press’s work as a watchdog of government establishes an important
trigger for expected counterspeech, and a third major theoretical justification
for our system of free speech, championed by First Amendment scholar Vincent Blasi, focuses on this “checking value.” 72
The construct, which emerged in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal,
is that freedom of speech and press have a critically important part to play in
“checking the abuse of power by public officials” and “guarding against
breaches of trust” by them. 73 “[T]he basic assumption of our political system
[is] that the press will often serve as an important restraint on government.” 74
The right of the press “to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor
and contend for or against change” is a matter that “the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep
67. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
68. Id. at 1735.
69. Id. at 1734 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U. S. 844, 868 (1997)) (“While in the

past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places (in a spatial
sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace – the ‘vast
democratic forums of the Internet’ in general, . . . and social media in particular.”).
70. Id. at 1735 (emphasis added).
71. Meiklejohn, supra note 49, at 255.
72. See Blasi, supra note 17, at passim.
73. Id. at 527.
74. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
585 (1983).
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it free.” 75 In performing this role, the free press “guards against the miscarriage
of justice” 76 and “has been a mighty catalyst in . . . exposing corruption among
public officers and employees.” 77
In one sense, the checking-function theory of free speech differs radically
from the marketplace-of-ideas and self-government theories in terms of its assumptions about executive counterspeech. The theory does not envision voluntary contributions of speech on certain matters by the president; indeed, its
major assumption is that, on at least some issues, government officials will
engage in secret wrongdoing and hide their misdeeds in ways that need to be
exposed by private speakers—often members of the press. Despite the assumptions of government fallibility and citizen distrust of government that lie at the
heart of the theory, 78 the theory also envisions that government officials will
speak with substance to the people. The checking function sheds light on the
fundamental nature of executive counterspeech in our society because its essential premise is that the private checking of government is part of a wider
structural tension of speech and counterspeech—in the form of press coverage
and meaningful response to that coverage.
That tension was the centerpiece of Justice Potter Stewart’s watershed
article, “Or of the Press,” in which he asserted that a free press meant not
merely “organized, expert scrutiny of government” and a “formidable check
on official power,” 79 but an active exchange between the press and government
leaders, through speech and counterspeech, baked into a larger structural plan.
Stewart argued that “the Founders deliberately created an internally competitive system” between the press and the executive, just as they had done in devising the three competing branches of government. 80 Their “purpose was[]
not to avoid friction,” but to combat autocracy “by means of the inevitable
friction.” 81 In this way, “the Free Press guarantee is, in essence, a structural
provision of the Constitution”—one that only serves its higher public-serving
goals if the other components of the structure, including thoughtful executive

75. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“The Constitution specifically
selected the press . . . to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs,” and
that “[t]he press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses
of power by governmental officials . . . .”).
76. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560 (1966) (quoting Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)).
77. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
78. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 86
(1982) (“Freedom of speech is based in large part on a distrust of the ability of government to make the necessary distinctions, a distrust of governmental determinations of
truth and falsity, an appreciation of the fallibility of political leaders, and a somewhat
deeper distrust of governmental power in a more general sense.”).
79. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 705, 708 (1999).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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counterspeech, are also observed. 82 We “rely, as so often in our system we
must, on the tug and pull of the political forces in American society.” 83 Blasi’s
theory anticipates executive counterspeech as a norm.
The United States Supreme Court also maintains this presumption of executive counterspeech. The Justices consistently assume speech and action on
the part of the elected official in response to the checking-function speech and
behavior by the press. In key Court opinions, the press is not depicted merely
as telling the public about officials’ misdeeds so that the public can decide what
action to take. 84 Rather, the Court says, “the press serves and was designed to
serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials
and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve.” 85 The
expectation is that the important “role of the media” is to “be a powerful and
constructive force, contributing to remedial action in the conduct of public
business.” 86 More than this, the watchdog press is portrayed as serving an educative function, with at least some of the information it conveys to the people
coming in the form of material provided to it by government officials. 87 Indeed, a fundamental norm underlying press freedom is a notion that the press
is a proxy for the citizen, engaging in the sort of substantive exchanges with
the government that the citizen is entitled to have herself but lacks the time or
resources to perform on her own. 88 In all of these capacities, the press’s freedom is built on a concept of executive speech to and through the press and
82. Id. at 707, 710 (“The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not
its resolution.”).
83. Id.
84. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403. U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in
the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry
– in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of
democratic government. For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is alert,
aware, and free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the First Amendment. For
without an informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened people.”).
85. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966).
86. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978).
87. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’n of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (alternation in original) (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Corp.,
297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)) (“[A]n untrammeled press is a vital source of public information.”); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (quoting
Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring)) (noting
the press is central to “public understanding of the rule of law . . . .”).
88. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (“[I]n a society in which
each individual has but limited time and resources with which to observe at first hand
the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him
in convenient form the facts of those operations.”). See generally RonNell Andersen
Jones, Press Speakers and the First Amendment Rights of Listeners, 90 U. COLO. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019).
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substantive responses to the concerns raised by the press on behalf of the public.
The Court’s jurisprudential approach to a free press further signals an expectation of executive counterspeech when it protects the press even in the face
of error or irresponsibility. 89 The Court openly concedes “that the press has,
on occasion, grossly abused the freedom it is given by the Constitution.” 90
While “deplor[ing] such excesses,” 91 the Court flatly refuses to “saddl[e] the
press” 92 with the “impossible burden of verifying facts with certainty.” 93 It
protects the press even when the press makes mistakes because of the expectation that government officials will counter any false information with clear,
truthful additional information. The idea is that the checking function will produce an ongoing pattern of revelations by the press followed by explanations,
clarifications, or corrections by the president. The Court is comfortable accepting “some degree of abuse” 94 by the press because it believes the substantive story will begin, but not end, with press coverage. This premise centers
on the norm of executive counterspeech.

B. The Expectation of Executive Counterspeech in the United States
Supreme Court’s Defamation Jurisprudence
Most specifically, the expectation of executive counterspeech is an undeniable theme in the Court’s First Amendment approach to false and defamatory
speech about public officials. 95 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 96 the most
89. RonNell Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press and
Why It Matters, 66 ALA. L. REV. 253, 259–60 (2014) (noting that the Court has historically protected the press “even when presented with strong counter-narratives—with
press-freedom values pitted against ‘other values society ordinarily wishes to see protected quite vigorously, like the rights of criminal defendants, reputational rights, and
rights of privacy’—or when confronted with evidence of press behavior gone awry or
concerns about inaccuracy, sensationalism, or unfairness . . . .”).
90. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 51 (1971), abrogated by Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
91. Id.
92. RonNell Andersen Jones, The Dangers of Press Clause Dicta, 48 GA. L. REV.
705, 712 (2014) (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)); see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (concluding that the constitution “require[s]
that the press have a free hand” even when it engages in “sensationalism”).
93. Jones, supra note 92, at 712.
94. Hill, 385 U.S. at 388–89 (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 571 (1876)) (“Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use
of every thing [sic], and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press.”).
95. See David Kohler, Self Help, the Media and the First Amendment, 35 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1263, 1272–73 (2007) (“[C]ounter-speech as an integral part of First Amendment theory has an unassailable pedigree, it has not often found its way in any explicit
sense into actual constitutional doctrine. The one clear exception to this is the constitutionalization of defamation law.”).
96. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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classic of checking-function cases, an executive official sued the press over
criticism of his official conduct, and the Court constitutionalized the law of
libel, calling for a heightened showing of fault in such cases. 97 An executive
official may not prevail in a libel action unless he is able to prove actual malice—that is, that the press organization acted with knowing falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth. 98 While Sullivan and its progeny are almost always
considered from the vantage point of the rights and protections of libel defendants, this jurisprudence also unmistakably sets forth a presupposition regarding
the public official, as the Court describes how it envisions false statements
about government officials will be countered. The cases in this area clearly
anticipate an ongoing norm of executive counterspeech.
The Court’s reasoning in Sullivan also has a deep Meiklejohnian thread,
endorsing “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” 99 and openly analogizing to the nation’s early rejection of seditious libel. 100 The Court reminds
us that because the form of self-government the Founders devised was “altogether different from the British form, under which the Crown was sovereign
and the people were subjects,” 101 the Constitution embraced a new form of
government-public dialogue.
The structure of Sullivan shows the Court’s confidence that this robust,
wide-open debate would sometimes—indeed, often—be in the form of dialogue that citizens would have with government officials themselves. Thus,
the Sullivan line of cases warns that those who seek public office must enter
that fray prepared to be spoken about 102 and prepared to speak back. Officials
should, the Court said, be treated as “men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy
climate.” 103 This is a judicial recognition not only that criticism would be the
cost of doing business as an elected official, but also that “public officials . . .
are made to bear the burden of ensuring that the public hears speech about
public matters.” 104
The confidence that the criticized government official will not merely sit
idly by as the press fulfills its checking function, but instead will actively engage in First Amendment counterspeech, is woven throughout the Sullivan line
Id. at 291–92.
Id. at 279–80.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 273–74; see also Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (noting
that N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan was “adjudicating in an area which lay close to seditious
libel, and history dictated extreme caution in imposing liability.”).
101. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 274.
102. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (describing the “compelling normative consideration” that “[a]n individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public
affairs. He runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case.”).
103. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 273 (citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)).
104. Tung Yin, Independent Appellate Review of Knowledge of Falsity in Defamation and False Statements Cases, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 325, 371 (2010).
97.
98.
99.
100.
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of cases. Endorsing a broad marketplace-of-ideas rationale, the Court echoed
Learned Hand’s maxim that the First Amendment “presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues . . . .” 105
The Sullivan Court spoke of the need for an “unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.” 106
It asserted that a “fundamental principle of our constitutional system” is the
need to foster dialogue that spurs officials to “be responsive to the will of the
people.” 107 Indeed, the Court stressed that the Sullivan actual malice standard
was both inspired by and modeled upon the privilege already enjoyed by government officials. 108 Executive branch officials enjoy such a privilege because
of our expectation of “fearless, vigorous, and effective” speech on their part,
the Court said, and “[a]nalogous considerations support the privilege for the
citizen-critic of government.” 109 The Court, in other words, views vibrant
speech and vibrant counterspeech as “fair equivalent[s],” 110 and its First
Amendment framework is constructed on a belief that the marketplace of ideas
will receive both.
The strongest signal of the Court’s constitutional expectation of executive
counterspeech in the Sullivan line of cases is the focus on “channels of effective
communication” in responding to falsehood. 111 The Sullivan Court concluded
that because “speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda,
105. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (quoting United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
106. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
107. Id. (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)); see also id.
at 301 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)) (“[I]mperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to
the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.
Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.”).
108. Id. at 281–82 (italics added) (“In Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 [(1959)],
. . . this Court held the utterance of a federal official to be absolutely privileged if made
‘within the outer perimeter’ of his duties.”).
109. Id. at 282; see also id. at 304 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Barr, 360
U.S. at 571) (“If the government official should be immune from libel actions so that
his ardor to serve the public will not be dampened and ‘fearless, vigorous, and effective
administration of policies of government’ not be inhibited, then the citizen and the press
should likewise be immune from libel actions for their criticism of official conduct.”);
Aaron Perzanowski, Comment, Relative Access to Corrective Speech: A New Test for
Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 833, 843 (2006) (footnotes omitted) (“[T]he
Court demonstrated sensitivity to a plaintiff’s ability to speak in determining appropriate liability standards. The Court reasoned that because public officials enjoyed unlimited immunity from defamation claims, the right of the public to criticize such officials
must be similarly unrestrained.”).
110. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282–83.
111. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
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[and] free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies,” 112
the stricter actual malice standard was fair to impose upon public officials. The
marketplace of ideas will sort truth from falsehood when the topic is the behavior of a prominent executive branch official because that official, who “certainly has equal if not greater access than most private citizens to media of
communication,” 113 will offer the clarifications and corrections necessary to
the endeavor.
This theme, which animates every post-Sullivan case on libel standards,
centers on the influence the public official has had—and the future influence
he or she can be expected to have—on meaningful public conversations. The
president’s ability to contribute to the dialogue and “significantly to influence
the resolution of those issues” 114 is the chief characteristic that justifies more
stringent restraints on his libel recovery. In later cases, the Court extended this
same reasoning to public figures who were not elected officials, but instead had
achieved other prominence or fame. 115 In applying the theme to public-figure
plaintiffs, 116 the Court offered an analogy to the public official’s capacity to
engage in counterspeech as a primary justification. 117 The “first remedy of any
victim of defamation is self-help—using available opportunities to contradict
112. Curtis Publ’g. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) (quoting Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951)) (summarizing Sullivan).
113. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
114. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (“There is, first, a strong interest in
debate on public issues, and second, a strong interest in debate about those persons who
are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of those issues.”).
115. See, e.g., Curtis Publ’g. Co., 388 U.S. at 136, 140, 155 (holding that Butts, a
university football coach, and Walker, who led a protest at a university, both had “political prominence” in the community, were public figures); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48, 49 (1988) (agreeing that Falwell, as a “nationally known minister who has been active as a public commentator on politics and public affairs,” is a
public figure).
116. Curtis Publ’g. Co., 388 U.S. at 154–55 (“[B]oth Butts and Walker commanded a substantial amount of independent public interest . . . and had sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be able to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies of the defamatory statements.”); see also id. at 164 (Warren, C.J.,
concurring) (emphasis added) (“And surely as a class these ‘public figures’ have as
ready access as ‘public officials’ to mass media of communication, both to influence
policy and to counter criticism of their views and activities.”).
117. See Ashley Messenger & Kevin Delaney, In the Future, Will We All be Limited-Purpose Public Figures?, COMM. LAW., Mar. 2014, at 4, 4–6 (analyzing cases and
arguing that a “realistic opportunity to counteract false statements” and “continuous
access” to the communication channels” are key); Nat Stern, Unresolved Antitheses of
the Limited Public Figure Doctrine, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1027, 1041 n.113 (1996) (noting
that, since Gertz, court have routinely cited access to the media, or lack of access, as
ground for classifying or refusing to classify the plaintiffs as public figures and citing
cases to support the proposition); Perzanowski, supra note 109, at 836–37, 842–43 (arguing that “the ability to respond to defamatory speech served as a central consideration
in the creation of the public figure test” and that “access to self-help through corrective
speech provides the primary justification for the current framework”).
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the lie or correct the error”—and both public officials and public figures thus
could be expected “to counteract false statements” and “influence the resolution of the issues involved.” 118
In cases finding that a series of plaintiffs fell short of public-figure status,
the Court repeatedly hinged its determination on the absence of “the regular
and continuing access to the media that is one of the accouterments of having
become a public figure.” 119 Libel plaintiffs who do not discuss matters with
the press, 120 make themselves central to a public conversation, 121 or “engage[
] the attention of the public in an attempt to influence the resolution of the
issues involved” 122 are not similarly situated enough to public officials to be
treated as constitutional equivalents. Only those who “thrust themselves into
the vortex of [a] public issue” 123 and use their situation “as a fulcrum to create
public discussion” 124 are engaged in the sort of speech-and-counterspeech behavior that the Court envisions.
Importantly, this jurisprudential focus on the corrective speech capacity
of the executive is not just a discussion of remedy for harm, but rather an exposition of First Amendment values and of the wider counterspeech norms
within those values. 125 Counterspeech by the president is expected not because
the Court is convinced that self-help will work, 126 but instead because we are
committed to more rather than fewer contributions to the marketplace of ideas
when government leaders and their work are the topic at hand. When the president faces “unsubstantiated opinions or deliberate misstatements,” the Court
has concluded as a structural, constitutional matter that “counterargument
118. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344, 345 (1974).
119. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 136 (1979).
120. See, e.g., Wolston v Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979)

(“[P]etitioner never discussed this matter with the press . . . .”); Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976) (“Nor did respondent freely choose to publicize issues . . .
.”); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 (noting the plaintiff did not “discuss[] either the criminal or
civil litigation with the press and was never quoted as having done so”).
121. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135 (“Hutchinson at no time assumed any role of public prominence in the broad question . . . .”); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 (noting that plaintiff
“did not engage the public’s attention . . .”).
122. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168.
123. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352; see also Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166 (“[T]he undisputed
facts do not justify the conclusion of the District Court and Court of Appeals that petitioner ‘voluntarily thrust’ or ‘injected’ himself into the forefront of the public controversy . . . .”).
124. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168.
125. See Perzanowski, supra note 109 at 841, 845 (suggesting “media access militates against the public figure’s interest in protection from defamation while simultaneously advancing independent First Amendment principles” and that “the democratic
necessity of open discourse provided the primary thrust for developing such a balance”).
126. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 n.9 (“[A]n opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to
undo harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is rooted in our
experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie.”).
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and education are the weapons available to expose these matters.” 127 As one
scholar noted, “the First Amendment does not guarantee effective remedies for
defamation – it guarantees free speech and a free press,” 128 and counterspeech
is a vital component of those freedoms. The interests at stake are not merely
the interests of the would-be plaintiff, who is getting relief for a damaged reputation, but the wider interests of third parties in the public, who are getting
both sets of information. 129 Counterspeech “does more than simply reduce the
vulnerability of public figures to libel and slander: it furthers the values espoused by the First Amendment. Corrective speech contributes to robust public
debate.” 130
Of course, we cannot force the president to engage. There is no obvious
constitutional mandate to respond to allegations, to offer corrections, or to provide substantive clarifications. 131 But the jurisprudence plainly envisions these
communications as the norm. The whole of First Amendment theory and the
core of the most important developments in modern media law are premised
on the notion that the president will counterspeak rather than nonresponsively
retort.

III. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF EXECUTIVE COUNTERSPEECH
The theoretical frameworks discussed above not only establish a constitutional expectation of executive counterspeech, but also help to demarcate the
line between what might fairly be classified as executive counterspeech and
what is mere nonresponsive retort. To contribute meaningfully to the marketplace of ideas, advance self-government, and enable the checking function,
counterspeech would necessarily have a few essential characteristics.
This Part explores those characteristics and contrasts them with the traits
of some of the nonresponsive retorts commonly employed by President Trump.
The issue of executive counterspeech is timely and urgent because there is reason to believe that President Trump “is different in kind and not just in degree”
from his modern predecessors in his hostility against and nonresponsiveness
127. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 304 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389 (1962)).
128. Bruce J. Borrus, Comment, Defamation and the First Amendment: Protecting
Speech on Public Issues, 56 WASH. L. REV. 75, 92 (1980).
129. See Yin, supra note 104, at 369 (“In a public official defamation case, we can
visualize three distinct entities affected by the lawsuit: the plaintiff, the defendant, and
the public. The plaintiff’s interest is in vindicating her reputation from the defamation
and obtaining compensation (and perhaps special damages) from the defendant. The
defendant’s interest stands in direct opposition to the plaintiff’s, which is to prove the
truth of the defaming statement. The public’s interest is in receiving information relevant to the public official.”).
130. Perzanowski, supra note 109, at 845.
131. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (“Neither the First
Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government
information or sources of information within the government’s control.”).
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toward the press. 132 But all presidents have engaged to one degree or another
in evasion, spin, or other nonresponsive reactions to the press, 133 and the principles discussed below apply to all executives. The modern, Trump-focused
examples serve the wider function of exploring the quality and quantity of exchange between the press and the president that best serves democracy and
comports with constitutional expectations.
Given the marketplace, Meiklejohnian, and checking-function goals for
dialogue on matters of public concern, the ideal executive counterspeech would
be responsive, would be based on facts and evidence, and would meaningfully
advance public conversations. It would go beyond mere contradiction to offer
counterargument—backed with reasoning and supporting evidence—and
would provide clear, specific refutation, identifying a mistake and explaining
to the reader why it is mistaken. 134 Counterspeech to objectionable news reporting, in particular, would squarely address what was said in the report and
meet it directly on its terms to offer a different perspective, more information
on the specific topic, additional unreported facts, or clarification and explanation of the facts reported.
Although it would be ideal to the citizenry if the provided facts were true,
the marketplace-of-ideas theory does not mandate this as a characteristic of
useful counterspeech. The theory assumes some falsehood will be contributed
to the market, but at its most basic level, it at least requires that there actually
be market contributions. 135 Competing, verifiable facts can be sorted, challenged, investigated, and tested, and the theory assumes that citizens will do
this testing and that from this competition of facts, truth will prevail. But this
sort of fact-challenging requires counterspeech that is on point and at least purportedly fact-based.
In contrast, executive reactions to objectionable press coverage are mere
nonresponsive retorts when they lack these characteristics. Bare labels—
“sad!” “wrong!” “lies!”—are too generic to meet the counterspeech criteria or
to serve any of the Meiklejohnian, checking-function, or marketplace goals.
Likewise, sweeping statements that purport to counter press coverage but are
in fact sourceless generalities, like the assertion that “many people say” 136
132. Id. at 1327–28.
133. See Jones & Sun, supra note 12, at 1328–31 (describing and comparing mod-

ern president-press tensions).
134. See How to Disagree, PAUL GRAHAM (Mar. 2008), http://www.paulgraham.com/disagree.html (“[R]efuting the central point” is the most responsive and powerful form of disagreement in the hierarchy of disagreements).
135. See Milton, supra note 22, at 50 (“Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who
ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?”).
136. See Jenna Johnson, ‘A Lot of People Are Saying…’; How Trump Spreads Conspiracies and Innuendoes, WASH. POST. (June 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/a-lot-of-people-are-saying-how-trump-spreads-conspiracies-andinnuendo/2016/06/13/b21e59de-317e-11e6-8ff77b6c1998b7a0_story.html?utm_term=.ebd06f7d83ec (analyzing Trumps approach to
assert controversial statements by utilizing third person attribution).
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something is true, are not true executive counterspeech because they provide
no verifiable, specific additional facts. Plainly, ad hominem attacks on the authors or publishers of press reports, such as engaging in simple name-calling
or belittling the authority of the writer without addressing the substance of the
press report, 137 are not mechanisms for addressing the substance of an argument and thus are nonresponsive retorts rather than counterspeech.
The assertion that a particular news report is “fake news,” without more,
is a nonresponsive retort rather than constitutionally valuable executive counterspeech. This is true for a number of reasons. First, “fake news” is nonresponsive because it gives no additional factual information. The phrase addresses no specific aspect of a given report, offers no clarification, and gives
no useful new material to contrast with the material of the press report. It contains no reasoning or refutation. It has none of the important features of democracy-serving, marketplace-of-ideas-enhancing, executive counterspeech.
Additionally, “fake news” is a nonresponsive retort because the term itself
has no clear meaning. Given the wide variety of contexts in which it has been
used, including its use as a reaction to press reports that very quickly proved
factually accurate, 138 the phrase as used by President Trump falls short of a
clear, evidence-based denial. It is ambiguous because the hearer does not know
if she is being told that the particular news story is biased, that it is politically
motivated, that it is factually erroneous in all of its facets, that it is factually
erroneous in some of its details, or that it is merely something that President
Trump wishes was not being covered. Executive counterspeech of the sort
envisioned by our longstanding constitutional theory would not leave a listener
guessing about something so simple as the nature of thing being countered.
Perhaps most significantly, the “fake news” response is not constitutionally valuable executive counterspeech because it is potentially deceptive terminology. This is because the words within the phrase have a pre-existing
primary linguistic meaning, and the phrase—although apparently repurposed
to mean something else—retains the residual effect of those more obvious connotations. “Fake” is a word with a longstanding definition—false, inaccurate,
fabricated, a hoax or fraud. In the run-up to President Trump’s election, the
term “fake news” was used widely to refer to the rising problem of actually

137. See Jones & Sun, supra note 12, at 1310–11 (detailing “name calling and competency-questioning” by Trump).
138. Margaret Sullivan, Trump Cries “Fake!” About Media Reports of White
House Chaos. But They Keep Getting Proven Right, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/trump-cries-fake-about-media-reports-of-white-house-chaos-but-they-keep-getting-proven-right/2019/01/02/5af4db600e8a-11e9-831f-3aa2c2be4cbd_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.abcc989c40db;
Eugene Kiely, Trump’s Phony ‘Fake News’ Claims, FACTCHECK.ORG (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://www.factcheck.org/2018/01/trumps-phony-fake-news-claims/ (detailing occasions when Trump has “labeled accurate news reporting as ‘fake news’”).
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fabricated news stories, and some dictionaries embraced the term as referencing this phenomenon. 139 At a time when there have been concerted efforts to
disseminate actual fabrications on Facebook and elsewhere, and when the nation already faces a crisis in media literacy and reader discernment, 140 it is damaging to self-governance and the marketplace of ideas to be further confusing
information consumers with this coopted term.
The least generous description of what is happening here is that President
Trump is purposefully and falsely accusing legitimate, mainstream news organizations of being engaged in the deliberate wholesale fabrication of stories.
Under this version of the events, in an effort to discredit all public discussion
unfavorable to him, 141 President Trump is deliberately undermining trust in
those who are working according to high journalistic standards and producing
carefully sourced stories about major public issues by wrongly accusing them
of inaccuracies or fraudulent reporting. This represents a severe threat to press
freedom, a deliberate undercutting of a critically important civic institution,
and an undermining of the free flow of information in a democracy. It does
not represent constitutionally valuable executive counterspeech.
But even the most generous description of what is happening here
amounts to a troubling lack of meaningful executive counterspeech. Under this
version of the events, President Trump and others in his administration are
merely being hyperbolic when they use this nonresponsive retort against the
press. They could, for example, be using the phrase “fake news” to apply to
something that might better be termed “fake newsworthiness.” This would be
a use of the term to indicate that President Trump takes issue, not with the facts
as reported, but with the priorities, editorial discretion, perceived bias, or angle
taken by the particular news outlet or story. Through this lens, when President
Trump retorts that something is “fake news,” he does not mean that the reporter
wholly fabricated the story or that she literally did not have sources who told
her the information that she reported; instead, he means that he wishes the
sources had said something different, that he wishes that the sources had not
talked to the press at all, 142 that he thinks other sources might have countered
139. Lili Levi, Real “Fake News” and Fake “Fake News”, 16 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 232, 233–235, 233 n.1 (2017).
140. See, e.g., Stanford Study Shows Most Students Vulnerable to Fake News, NPR
(Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/11/22/503052574/stanford-study-findsmost-students-vulnerable-to-fake-news (reporting that a study from Stanford University found “large portions of the students [surveyed] . . . had trouble judging the credibility of the news they read”).
141. Leslie Stahl: Trump Admitted Mission to Discredit the Press, CBS NEWS,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/lesley-stahl-donald-trump-said-attacking-press-todiscredit-negative-stories/ (last updated May 23, 2018) (quoting Trump as saying, “I
do it to discredit you all and demean you all so when you write negative stories about
me, no one will believe you.”).
142. See, e.g., Rebecca Morin, Trump Says Leaks Exaggerated but Vows to Track
(May
14,
2018),
https://www.politDown
‘Traitors’,
POLITICO
ico.com/story/2018/05/14/trump-leaks-traitors-white-house-586041.
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that source, or that he wishes the news outlet would focus on other subjects
more favorable to him. That is, perhaps when President Trump says, “This is
fake news,” he is saying, “This is not news” rather than “This is not true.”
This explanation might place President Trump in a somewhat more favorable light, but it does not make this “fake news” retort appropriate executive
counterspeech. Having failed to specify what he means by the term, he leaves
open the very real possibility that citizens will wrongly assume its meaning.
When a president says, “This is not what I would call newsworthy,” but does
so using a label that can also mean “This is not factually true,” there is a very
real risk of deceiving listeners and mischaracterizing the work of journalists.
The phrase cannot carry both meanings without imposing chaos in the marketplace of ideas and the realm of public affairs reporting. Thus, under both scenarios, the “fake news” phrase represents an abandonment of the norm of executive counterspeech and the embrace of unhelpful nonresponsive retort.
Two important practical realities seem to be animating the rise of nonresponsive retorts and the declining norm of substantive executive counterspeech. Although a deep investigation is beyond the scope of this Article, both
are worth noting for their important interrelationships with the problem addressed here. The first is a changing communications and media landscape.
The waning legacy media 143 and the emerging ability of presidents to engage
directly with the people through social media 144 change the calculus on executive counterspeech. While the velocity and volume of social media communications could conceivably support more and better counterspeech from the executive to the people in response to press coverage, some aspects of this new
media technology seem to instead embolden nonresponsive retorts. Character
limits in some social media communications, for example, may push a president to respond in less fulsome and more hyperbolic or reactionary ways than
he might have in the past. The directness of social media communications
make it possible for a president to cut out the press as an intermediary and thus
ignore the previous, longstanding norms of being interviewed by members of
the press and responding substantively to their reports. 145 Ironically, while
Twitter and other social media tools have the capacity to be significantly more
interactive than older forms of media, they also eliminate the direct journalistic-interview feature of legacy press coverage that so often made presidents
feel obligated to offer substantive counterspeech. Thus, in this new media era,
the president engages less, rather than more, with the facts reported by others.
143. See generally RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a Post-Newspaper America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV 557 (2011) (detailing the
decline of legacy media).
144. Jones & Sun, supra note 12, at 1342–43 (describing the shift to direct presidential communication by Twitter).
145. Id. at 1343 (“[F]or the first time in press-President relations, the press has gone
from being a necessary evil to merely being an evil,” and that because of social media,
“[w]hat to say to the press, whether to engage with them, and even how to depict them
to the wider public audience all become questions that can be answered unencumbered
by the structural realities of the past”).
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A second compounding factor in the uptick of nonresponsive retorts is the
epistemological tribalism that increasingly pervades American politics and
communications. Voters are increasingly entrenched in their own echo chambers, and this might suggest that those who support a particular president may
no longer demand any counterspeech at all but instead be satisfied with—or
even celebrate—nonresponsive retorts. This phenomenon, sometimes referred
to as “post-truthism,” 146 in which “objective facts are less influential in shaping
public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief,” 147 has created a
political culture in which either “truth matters less than it used to” 148 or “some
people ‘find’ truth through the use of post-truth reasoning: they discount empirical data and rely instead upon emotional inputs, personal belief, deference
to authority, and trust—even to determine truths that are empirically testable
[.]” 149 Research suggests that individuals are deeply influenced by their cognitive biases and, in particular, that they select interpretations of data that conform with their political priors. 150 Thus, nonresponsive retorts seem increasingly acceptable to at least a portion of the population. If one’s political base
has no appetite for executive counterspeech and one’s political opposition has
no mechanism for forcing it, it should be no surprise that nonresponsive retorts
are the new go-to reply for a president facing objectionable press coverage.
Whatever the complex set of factors causing the apparent shift from a
background expectation of executive counterspeech to a field predominated by
nonresponsive retorts, the counterspeech norm that undergirds both First
Amendment theory and free speech jurisprudence is now routinely spurned.

146. See Sarah C. Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment, 94 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (“Essentially, post-truthism teaches that people should not use evidencebased reasoning to make decisions, but should rely instead on emotion, intuition, and
belief.”).
147. Word of the Year 2016 Is . . ., OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016 (last visited Oct. 3, 2018) (announcing “post-truth” as word of the year for 2016).
148. Haan, supra note 146.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened SelfGovernment, 1 BEHAV. PUB. POL’Y 54, 74 (2017) (“[W]hen policy-relevant facts become identified as symbols of membership in and loyalty to affinity groups that figure
in important ways in individuals’ lives, they will be motivated to engage empirical evidence and other information in a manner that more reliably connects their beliefs to
the positions the predominate in their particular groups than to the positions that are
best supported by the evidence.”).
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IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ABANDONING EXECUTIVE
COUNTERSPEECH
Violating democratic norms comes with costs. 151 A refusal to engage in
executive counterspeech harms the nation, its people, and its press in specific
and easily identifiable ways. When a president replaces meaningful, substantive counterspeech with nonresponsive retorts to press coverage, there are at
least three sets of real-world consequences. These might be labeled “Accountability Consequences,” “Marketplace-of-Ideas Consequences,” and “Press
Consequences.” Combined, these effects threaten to create an unprecedented
impairment to our national conversations.

A. Accountability Consequences
The first set of harms of a president’s refusal to engage in executive counterspeech centers on the self-governance and checking functions that counterspeech would otherwise promote. If executive counterspeech offers citizens
the information they need to properly participate in their democracy, the withholding of it robs them of that opportunity. Thus, a major harm of the failure
to engage in executive counterspeech—and, perhaps, a major motivation for
that failure—is the lack of presidential accountability that attends it. When no
counterspeech is offered, the citizen loses her ability to make decisions about
actions taken and policies embraced by the president. The voter is left without
knowledge on which to base support or opposition to a given policy and without information on which to make a decision at the ballot box. 152 The citizen
cannot know what the executive knows, what the executive believes, what the
executive stands for, or what the executive has done if she is fed a steady diet
of nonresponsive retorts. Even the most participatory, earnest citizens cannot
engage in the basics of self-governance if they are given only a set of press
reports that the president demands not be believed, while he provides no counter-information about what they should instead know or understand. Taken to
its extreme, the abandonment of the norm of executive counterspeech leads to
an utter failure of both governmental accountability and self-government itself.
This reality illustrates that an abandonment of the norm of executive
counterspeech is not merely an executive failing—although it certainly is that.
It is also a public failing. Elected officials cannot reasonably be expected to
151. See, e.g., RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, Opinion, Don’t Expect
the First Amendment to Protect the Media, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/opinion/dont-expect-the-first-amendment-toprotect-the-media.html.
152. Of course, a citizen could determine that the lack of factual information provided by an incumbent was grounds for refusing to re-elect, and Americans may yet
make that determination in response to the current administration. But the more fundamental principle remains that nonresponsive retorts leave most citizens in the dark
about many aspects of government decision-making.
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hold themselves fully accountable, and their self-interests may often push
against the public interest. 153 Current trends strongly suggest not only that
President Trump is ignoring the norm of engaging in counterspeech, but also
that the public is ignoring the norm of demanding it. The consequence is a
dearth of the sort of informed, critical, and factual exchanges on which democracy ordinarily rests.

B. Marketplace-of-Ideas Consequences
A second, related set of harms from a president’s refusal to engage in
counterspeech focuses on the ways that this refusal impacts the marketplace of
ideas. Nonresponsive retorts—especially from speakers like the president,
who is a unique keeper of information that is either held exclusively by him or
best distributed broadly by him—disserve the search for truth.
So, for example, if every time President Trump has responded with “fake
news” he had instead responded with either “This is not true and here is the
evidence” or “This is accurate but has been misinterpreted and here are the
details to help you better understand,” the caliber of contribution to the marketplace would be exponentially higher. Observers in the marketplace would
have had real tools with which to decide the truth of the matter and counterfacts
would have advanced the dialogue about the propriety of the decisions that had
been made. The “fake news” retort harms the marketplace whether the press
report is false or true. If these counterfacts do not exist, President Trump is
harming the marketplace with deceptive signals. His cry of “fake news” is
itself fake. If the counterfacts do exist, he is also harming the marketplace by
withholding them and thereby robbing the marketplace of the competition between the challenged report and the new facts. In nearly every instance, it is
easy to see how counterspeech would have advanced dialogue and how nonresponsive retorts shut it down. Speech and counterspeech can be complicated
partners in the marketplace, and issues of politics, national security, or personal
preference might understandably keep a president from squarely answering
every challenge raised in a media report or candidly providing all of the facts
in his possession. But, in some instances, no response at all would be less
damaging to the marketplace of ideas than the potentially deceptive nonresponsive retort.
More fundamentally, the disappearing norm of executive counterspeech
harms the wider viability of the marketplace of ideas as an enduring American
construct. When the executive, who sets the tone for the nation and models the
climate for the nation’s major collective conversations, sends the signal that
factual, responsive contributions to the marketplace of ideas are no longer required, expected, or valued, it imposes a larger national loss. Lowering these
expectations in our public discourse makes it less likely that others will use
153. See Blasi, supra note 17, at 529 (“The tendency of officials to abuse their public trust is a theme that has permeated political thought from classical times to the present.”).
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competing empirical claims to engage substantively with their intellectual opponents. Other searches for truth will be less fruitful. The patterns that we
embrace as acceptable at the highest level of national discourse reflect our commitment to truthseeking in the marketplace. The post-truthism that seemingly
emboldens President Trump to flout the norm of executive counterspeech becomes more entrenched as a substitute framework for national dialogue when
his nonresponsive retorts go unchallenged or, worse yet, are accepted as the
new normal.

C. Press Consequences
A third set of harms resulting from a president’s refusal to engage in counterspeech centers on the press and its role in a democratic society. Importantly,
these harms do not rise and fall on the question of whether the press is performing its functions well or poorly—the absence of executive counterspeech works
harms on the public in either event.
The United States Supreme Court routinely assumes that the press is performing valuable, democracy-enhancing work. 154 If that is the case, President
Trump’s decision to employ nonresponsive retorts can be dangerous to the continued legitimacy of an important institution. 155 This is most obviously true
when his chosen nonresponsive retort is a direct, ad hominem attack on a specific journalist or on the institutional press as a whole, 156 but it is also true when
he makes more a generic allegation that an issue or coverage area is “fake
news.” These labels construct the press as an enemy and impede it in its ability
to communicate with the public and to do work on behalf of the public. The
watchdog and proxy functions of the press rely on a foundation of respect for
the institution, even when there is serious disagreement about the particulars
of its work. 157 Nonresponsive retorts that attack rather than enlighten pose
serious threats to that valuable informational structure. If the president unfairly
maligns the press with labels that suggest its reporting is inaccurate when that
reporting is in fact just disfavored by the executive, there are grave consequences to our ability to have meaningful national conversations, to be educated about public matters, 158 and to be represented by the press as it attends
public functions and asks questions of the government. 159
But even if we assume the converse—that the press is doing its job poorly
and its coverage is inaccurate, biased, or otherwise flawed—the failure of the
president to engage in meaningful counterspeech continues to work harm on
154. Jones, supra note 89, at 254.
155. See Jones & Sun, supra note 12, at 1347–67 (describing the risks of the presi-

dent undercutting the press).
156. See id. at 1346.
157. See id. at 1333–34 (describing the ways that President Nixon, despite serious
tensions with the press, continued to convey that it was institutionally legitimate and
constitutionally important).
158. See id. at 1361–63 (discussing the educational function of the press).
159. Id. at 1364.
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the nation and its people. Indeed, the instances in which the press makes errors
or otherwise falls short of the ideal of delivering comprehensive, truthful, and
unbiased information are the instances when executive counterspeech—rather
than bare nonresponsive retort—may be most important. The checking function performed by speech on matters of public concern runs in two directions,
and a president who fails to offer any counterspeech to press coverage that he
perceives as inaccurate is failing to check the press. The press might, of course,
be countered by other speakers—and even by other press speakers—but to the
extent the president is the individual possessing the crucial countering information, his response that the report is “fake news” falls short of being counterspeech. Repetition of a “fake news” trope leaves the public nearly as uninformed as it was by the problematic reporting. It does not adequately show
where the error lies, provide any replacement information, or give the reading
or viewing public any tools for selecting more accurate media sources.
The “internally competitive system” of speech and counterspeech that the
Founders “deliberately created” 160 needs the “friction” 161 of substantive, specific, factual pushback from the president. Like the checks and balances that
preserve the distribution of power among the branches of government, 162 the
checks and balances between the executive and the press only meet the interests
of the people if each party is actively guarding against the excesses of the other.
Either party’s failure to engage in that “tug and pull” 163 leaves the public at
best underserved and at worst affirmatively misled and imperiled.
Indeed, each additional use of nonresponsive retorts may further compromise the president’s ability to check the press when it does commit reporting
error. If a retort like “fake news” is used with enough regularity and consistently invoked in situations where there has not been actual falsehood, the reading public will be unable to distinguish when the label is accurate in its descriptive sense—that is, when it is being told that the news item has been fabricated
and is factually false. One journalist has already noted this concern in relation
to a particularly lurid tale that President Trump has denounced as “fake
news.” 164 “[President]Trump has cried ‘fake news’ so frequently that his angry

160. Stewart, supra note 79, at 708.
161. Id. (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,

dissenting)).
162. Id. at 707 (“[T]he Free Press guarantee is, in essence, a structural provision of
the Constitution.”).
163. Id.
164. Ashley Parker, Real or ‘Fake News’? Either Way, Allegations of Lewd Tape
Pose Challenge for Trump, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/real-or-fake-news-either-way-lewd-tape-allegations-pose-a-challenge-for-trump/2018/04/13/098cdedc-3f2b-11e8-8d53eba0ed2371cc_story.html?utm_term=.69155d588306.
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denials have lost their wallop, part of a routine call-and-response with the media rather than evidence of legitimate inaccuracy.” 165 Thus, despite its apparent goal of disparaging and discrediting the press, 166 a nonresponsive retort
used in place of executive counterspeech may leave the press insufficiently
critiqued by the president. A president who attacks the press as biased or incompetent, and who has the capacity to prove it by presenting superior or corrective facts, would better advance his agenda by presenting those facts.

V. CONCLUSION
There is a widening disconnect between the presidential communications
anticipated by the marketplace-of-ideas, self-governance, and checking-function theories and the actual responses offered by President Trump to press coverage that he finds objectionable. While these foundational principles call for
responsive, factual, evidence-based counterspeech that aids the search for truth,
advances public conversations, and enables accountability, the nonresponsive
retorts employed by President Trump—including his iconic “fake news” mantra—serve none of those aims. They at best offer bare contradiction and at
worst constitute deliberate deception. Democracy relies upon executive counterspeech that contains factual evidence and supporting reasoning and that engages in specific refutation rather than generalized critique or ad hominem attack. An executive’s refusal to engage in counterspeech on matters of public
concern not only is inconsistent with fundamental principles of First Amendment theory, but also is harmful in concrete ways to the goal of governmental
accountability, to the society’s ongoing search for truth, to the wider tone of
national conversation, and to the democracy-enhancing role of the press.

165. Id.
166. Leslie Stahl: Trump Admitted Mission to Discredit the Press, supra note 141.
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